




'.Iames ("History of Peacekeeping: An Analytic Perspective")provided a classification of the variety of tlpes of peacekeeping in terms of the
form and function of such efforts. Was the conflict ideological or one of ethnic
conflict, or had there been a massive violation of human rights? Was the
peacekeeping operation one of enforcement or one of a good will ambassador and
counsellor coming between warinq parties? Was it a border operation or one whichfell within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state? What was the purpose of the
peacekeepers if they did operate within the territorial jurisdiction of a state?
If ALan James provided a classificatory analysis that stressed
the continuity of peacekeeping operations since W{ II, Tom Weiss (nPeacekeepingSince 1985") offered a conceptual analysis and a somewhat different
classiflcation that stressed the discontinuity between the increased nurnber of
peacekeeping operations of the last few years and those that predated them
because hi-s focus was not on the form and function of the peacekeeping operationsprinarilyr but on the local authority granting permission for the peacekeepinginitiative. The Agenda fot Peace does not mention the term, "intervention'r once,but the new tlpe of peacekeeping operation in northern frag, in Somalia, in
Bosnia-Hercegovj-na, and even in Cambodia have been interventionist operations
without the consent of any or aII the parties to the conflict. Further, partiesto the conflict have been political or ethnic qroups which had no constituted
authorlty of any kind.
Phillippe Kirsch ("Legal Issues") complemented Tom Weiss'sdistinctions by filling i-n the legal aspects to differentiate classical
peacekeeping from the expanded operations thaf have energed since 1-988 and a new
tni-ra t1pe which operates in an recedented environment where the peacekeepersr o cl nl n P c 1n  unp qenE q r c n cn K
are no longer present as a result of the formal consent of the conflictingparties and are present wlthin the borders of a state with both a more proactive
role and greater risk to the peacekeepers. Hence, the rules of engagement differ.F\rther, the peacekeepers may be there as much to protect civilians as to keep
the warring parties apart. Thus, the peacekeepers may have different functions,
such as providing security for humanitarian assistance and safe havens. The
orohibition asainst interference in the domestic affairs of a state has been setiside somewhaf in the new peacekeeping mode.
Complementing these theoretica] and historical papers have been
a series of much more grounded presentations - case studies of Cyprus and the
Western Sahara, a detailed analysis of the high cost and multiplication of these
new operations and the inadeguate resources to pay for them while the UN ltse1f
was expanding its responsibilities in the protection of the environment, human
rights and the provision of hunanitarian relief which have added to the pressures
on-the infrastructure and personnel of the UN, and the innovative steps that are
underway to develop the intelligence, planning, chain of conunand, decision making
and communication capacity of the UN to respond to these new challenges.
fn the alternating provision of an intellectual framework for
Iooking at the issues and much more grounded analysis in terms of actual
operations, this paper will weigh in on the side of a theoretical analysis.
, Hbwever, instead of providing an analysis and classification of peacekeeping
, operations in terms of form, funct5.on, politicaL theory and legal practS-ce, this
ip-aper will attempt to provide an anshrer to the two guestions raised by Arnbassador
lLoiris Frechette. In what situations should the international community intervene
Jwtren there are a multitude of ethnic conflicts and civil wars on this earth, when
I
l
intervention no longer follows the-classical poJ-iey of reguiring the agreement
of the partie.s to the conflict and. where ethnic qrggpq or ideoloqicaL eneinies maybe at each others throats rather than between two different states? Second1y, hoil
should the international corununity intervene? Or as CoLonel John Bremner pul-bothquestions so pithily-,. "where 
-are we going?" This paper offers to prbvide agrundlegung, a grounding for the new rnodes of peacekeeping in refugee tneory.
A Philosophical Preface-The Kantian Vision
Individuals and groups who carry the onerous burden ofpeacekeepin_g. and peac-emaking deal wilh the gritty r-eality of risking lives andprotecting 1ives. Philosophers deal with such esoteric subjects at wtr-at it meansto live- the good life. It is difficult to be concerned about the good life whenyour job is sinply to protect the living.
rrunanuel Kant, the great German philosopher who wrote at the end
of the eighteenth century, began his essay on Perpetual Peace with these remarks:
lThg pr?gtical politicial. (and r-mighf. add, the practical military officer ordiplomat) assumes the attitude of looking down with great self-satisfaction onthe politilal 
.theorist as. pedant whose etnpty ideas in no way threaten thesecurity of the stater- inasmuch as the state must proceed on empiricalprinciplesi so the theorist is alJowed to play his game without interferen-ce fromthe worldly-wise statesman." If you think war is dang,erous, look at the danger
of showing disdain and contempt 
-or even condescension for the realm of theory indplaying with apparently empty ideas. Even if the ancient Athenians took the wrong
course in executing Socrates just for being a philosopher, they correctlidiscerned that philosophers are very dangerous and- insidious. Look -at ImmanueiKant hirnself. He introduced the idea of envisionlnq a peaceful world policed by
a League of Nations - surely the emptiest and most hair-brained idea-the worli
had heard to that date when the governing principle of the world of internationalaffairs was that each state vras n-re.lely res-ponsible for its own security. Beware
of empty ideas. They have the habit of filLing up with action.
ourideaso."",iiti,liio:::'"3;:"3!yi,t"'.ii,ifr'?""'t#'*1,":"ris.u'h j"f T;Bf
se.minal PaPgf' that we are simply asking worldly-wise statesmen, diplomats andnilitary.officers to act conrirtcntfy lq_the case of conflict. Bewaie not onlyof the Ides of March and the ideas of philosophers, but of reguests that you b6
consistent in your actions.
With that warning label - namely, that philosophers as well as
cigarettes are dangerous to your health - let us recall the content of theKantian vision and the idea that I believe has been singularly responsible in the
realm of theory for the role Canadians and others have been increasingly askedto play as peacekeepers for the United Nations.
Kant wrote thatr "there must be a leagrue of peace (foeduspacificun)." Though this centraL idea of Kant's is often recalled, the two
criteria he set for its implementation may have been forgotten. Kant went on todistinguish a league of peace "from a treaty of peace (pactum pacis) by the factthat the latter terminates only one war, while the former seeks to make an end
of all wars foreyer. " The long term goal was not just an armistice or even simply
a peace treaty betweeri the warring parties, but each peacekeeping operation
should be assessed in terms of whether or not it contributes or detracts from thelong term goal of terminating war altogether. Kant went onto say that, "Thisleague does not tend to any dominion over the power of the state itself and of
other states in leagiue with it." (356) The immediate goal was not dominion over
the state but merely the maintenance of freedom and security. The inhabitants of
the state itseLf had to renain responsible for reconstructing their civil society
and reestablishing the government. I remind you of these two criteri-a which urere
set out in the first vision of an international peacekeeping force.
Ambassador Louise Frechette raised the guestion about guidelines
about where to iatervene and how to intervene gJ-ven the multj.tude of conflicts
around the world. Kant provided two guidelines. In the answer to where, you haveto ask the guestion whether the intervention will advance the day when we canIive on this earth without war. That is the security criterion. Secondly, with
respect to the issue of how, the answer is to establish faw and order not to beking of the castle, but to establish law and order so that humans in that area
are free to establish their own governments and develop their own civil
societies. The qhoice of where to provide peacekeepers must be guided by whetherthe operation contributes to the long term goal of terminating war altogether.
The choice of how to introduce a peacekeeping operation must be guided by theprinciple that the league of peace must not seek dominion over a society but onlythe security so that the people of that society are free to choose their owngovernment and construct their own civil society.
The Kantian vision was a product of the historical imagination,
a created wor1d, a.self-contained entity which serves as an end-in-itse1f. Kant
was not concerned with a possible world in the sense of alt,ernative events and
actions that could have happened instead of what actually did happen.3e Kant was
concerned with a possible future world. What I novr want to show, however
sketchily, is how, in the twentieth century, we have witnessed the application
and development of this possible idea through four different actual phases in the
development of international refugee policy. These are not arbitrary phases, but
stages in which "each and every element has a specific role in the interrelated
whoie. "ao
{r Historica} Perspective on Refqqees-Four Phases of DeveLopment
The devel-opment of international policy with respect to refugeesin the twentieth centuly can be divided into four phases, roughly separated bythe four guartiles of this century. These four phases in which the newinternational. refugee order has deveLoped over the twentieth century to deat withthe flow of refugees and provide humanitarian assistance may be sununarized as
foll.ows:
The Dqvelopment of an Inte:national Response to Refuqee Flows







Repatriation (of DPs) versus Resettlement (of
refugees)
Protection for individuals who were outside the borders of their
home state and who had a well-founded fear of persecution
Humanj.tarian and settlement assistance for those in refugee-Iike
situations
39 Cf. c"offrey Hasthorn, Plausible worldst Possibi-lity and lrnderstanding in tistory and t}te
social Sciences, Cambrldge: calbridge unlverslty Pres8, 1991.
40JoseC. Berllejo-Barrera, "ExplicatlngthePast,'HistoryandTheory32: Nov.,1993, p.21.
Bermeyo-Barrera has written a nunber of books in Spanish on the philosophy of historypsjciodnaljsjs def conociaiento hiet6rico (l.tad!id, t982), EL FinaJ. de la Hjstoria Tedrica (Hadrld,
198?), Replanteamiento de Ia Historia: gassayos de llistoria te6rica II (Uadr1d, 1989), and
ltrndanentaci6n 76gica de la flistoria (Madrid, 1991) .
Phase IV Stemming flows of Refugees
rarer became *iH':: o*:?f.t F:f"i: tt,ty;s""!ilIr""i"?1rtT"sl"*isT',:r1u:3:
could flee to start a new life. The whole earth had not yet been carved up intopoJ-itical entities divided by borders with control-s to lirnit entry and
resettlement. Individuals who suffered under one political jurisdiction couldflee to and resettle in another jurisdiction. Individuals and families fled to
a jurisdiction where they would not be persecuted. It was a period of spontaneousself selection and self-settlement where the opportunities were open and the
responsibili.ty for seeking and finding a safe haven rested with the refugees
themselves.
The second phase beganinply facilitated the separation of the two
conununities. Asia Minor, for exarnple, was expunged of its large Greek populationin 1923. (Marrus, pp. 96-109) !{here separation and parti.tion were not seen aspracticable, as was the case in the fLight of the Armenians from the mass murder
and persecution by the Turks' the League of Nations acted to assist in their
resettlement. (Marrus, pp. 14-87; 119-127)
Resettlement was the core approach to refugees who fled as a
result of ideological conflict' such as the 8001000 Russians throughout Europein 1921 or the 10r000 Italian anti-fascists who resettled in France in the 1930s.
However, when the problem was ethnic persecution on a massive scale and it was
no longer perceived to be practicable for countries mired in the great depressionto accept refugees, bc_rders were closed. The High Cons,nission for Refugees hadbeen established in 1933 to deal with these refugees, but James G. McDonald
resigmed in L935 in protest at the very few resettlement places available to deal
with the refugees and the unwillingness of the international community to tacklethe problern at .its source. (Marrus, pp. 151=166) Even the Evian Coriference in
1938, specifically called to deal with the Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany in
a carefully orchestrated public relations exerc5.se, affirmed the rights ofqovernments to lfuLit the intake of refugees on the basis of whether they werelikely to be able to reestablish-thenselves given the absorptive capacity bf the
receiving state. (Marrus, pp. 166-201)
Even after the end of Worl.d $lar II, the policy of forced
repatriation continued. The Potsdam Agreement{r made provision and the allies
implemented the forced repatriation of the Oeustdeutsch who had lived in Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary for generations - when the exodus from Russia and theBaltic states are inc]uded it is estinated that 11 million Germans were
repatriated to the devastated economy of a Germany with a populat,ion of only
40r000,000 people at the time. The Yaita Agreement 6f rebruary,'1945,{2 providedfor the repatriation of Soviet citizens without obtaining their consent, aprovision which was largely but not entirely implemented.
llowever, it must be recalled that if people were forcefully
repatriated, they vrere not cal,led refugees. For if you were scheduled for
repatri.ation, you were not a refugee, but were formally referred to as Displaced
Persons. The debate over nomenclature focused oD the International Refuqee
t1 cf. A. de zayas,
19?7. See also lilarlus, pp.
Neaesis at Potsdam: tie Anglo-etericans and tlre E:<pulsion of tlle GerDans,
326-3s1.
42 tl. Tolstoy, victims of YaLta,19?? and tlark R. Elliott, Pavns of yalta, Soniet Refugees
and America's Role in Their Repatriatiot, Chicago, 1982.
Organizatign (rR9).13_ 
-Ury5na, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agencyset up at the end of 1943' was not authorized to deal wiLh or find solutions foi
refugees who "who cannot return to their homes."a{f Soviet citizens without
obtaining their consent, a provision which was largely but not entirelyimplemented.
However, it must be recalled that if people were forcefully
repatriated, they were not calTed refugees. For if you were scheduled foi
repatriation, you were not a refug_ee, but 
-were formally referred to as DisplacedPersons. The debatq over nomenclature focused on the International n-efuqeeOrganizatiq., (rRo).15- Uu|na, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation age;cy
set up at the end of 1943, was not authorized to deal with or find solutions foi
refugees who "who cannot return to their homes.n45 UNRRA dealt with Dps.
In the IRO constitution, set up to succeed UNRRA and to escapethe agreements to forcefully repatriate people, a distlnction was made betwe-en
refugees -- pre--ol post- war victims of Nazi or fascist regimes or of racial,
religious or political persecution and displaced persons lOes) who weredisplaced in the course of or after l{orld War II. With respect to DPs, the IRO
was "to encourage and assist in every possible manner the early return to their
countries of origin".{? If 
'Jews wbr-e classified as DPs, ine IRO would bee:<pected.to arrangg fgq their repatri,ation. "A 
-DP may be defined as a persondisplace4 by war Fut wishin-g _qo return home once the fighting is over. A re-fugee,on the other hand' may be defined as a person who has fled home and who does-not
wish to return, at least not to the circumstances which occasioned flight.nre
The end of the second phase of international refugee poricy canbe characterized by induced resettlement for a population whictr coritd n6t Ue
repatriated by either force or internat,ional law and nonns. The treatment of theJews and the Palestinian Arabs characterized this shift.
Cf._Roger zetter,. nLabelllng Refugees:--{grninS and Transforning a Bureaucratic Identity,i(.Iouna.l of Refuqee Studies, ,l:1, November, 1991) where Roger uses the case of Cyprus to indicilethe lmportant consequences of labelllng. Fo! the history of I,NR&A, see Louill Holborne, lhe
Itte-ry1!:onal Retuge^e-_Otganization: A Special-ized Aqency of the Ohited t\tations - rts ttjstory and ttork7946-7952, London, 1956.
{{ UN do.. A/C.3,/SR.l.-11. Cf . ceorge tfoodbridge, UlirRRA: t}le Hjstory of the Unjted ltatjonsRelief and Reiabilitatjon A(tujnistratjon, 3 vols. (Nec Yorkt Columbia Unlversity presa, 1950) t{arrus
oeustdeutscl who had lived in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary for generatlons - rdhen the exodusfrom Russla and the BaJ.tic states are included lt ls esti.nated that. u niIllon GerDans lrere
repatliated to the devastated economy of a Germany with a populatlon of on1y,10,000,000 people atthe tine. The Yalta Agleenent of February, 19{5, provlded for the repatriatl
,q'- cf. Roger zettet, "Labelllng Refugeen: Formlng and Transforminq a Bureaucratic Identltyri(Journa"l of Refugee Studies, ,l:1, November, 1991) uhere Roger uses the case of cyprus to indicatethe inpoltant consequences of labeIling. For the history of IJNRRA, see Loul.se Holborne, Thefnternational Refuqee^-Orqanization: A Specialized Agency of the Onited l\tations - tts History and Work
7946-7952, London, 1955.
45 try doc. A/C.3/sR.1-11. Cf. Georqe l{oodbrldqe, cwRRa.' ttle History of the united t\tationsReljef andReiaDi.l.itationAchinistration,3 vols, (NetrYork: ColunbiaUniversltyPless, 1950) trtarrus
estimated ITNRRA was responsible for returnlng almost 2 urlllion refugees nhlch stlll left G50,000tfithout homes. (p. 320) See aLso Klm Salomon, "The Cold war Heritage: ITNRRA and the IRO asPredecessors of the IrNllcR, i ln G6ran Rystad, ed. ?'le lbrooted: Eorced Miqration as an fnternationa.l
Probfem in the Post-tlar gra, Lund Unlverslty Ptess, 1990. For a guide to ITNRRA archival sources see!tar11la B. Guptil, "Records of the Unlted Natlons Relief and Rehabllltatlon Adninistratlon, 1943-1948," ;tournal of refuqee Studies, 5:1, No. !, !992.
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If Jews were classified as refugees, then Palestine was the
obvious place for them to be resettled, given the terms of the Mandate and thelimitation of other options. As the Report of the High Commissioner for Refug€es
submitted to the Twenty-First Ordinary Session of the Leaque of Nations Assembly
had noted, "Palestine alone has made a contribution of any sj.ze' in reference tolarge-scaLe or group settlement of ,Jews.ae
?he Arab countri-es, led by Egypt and supported by Britain, first
attempted to set repatriation as the goal of the- IRO for all persons, whether
refugbes or DPs. Mr. Kamel, the delegate of Egyptso, propose mending paragraph
2 of the Preanble of the Draft Constitution of IRO to reguire serious r-easons tojustify resettlem_ent. Though defeated, the British delegate led the oppositionto the provisions' (which passed) defining German and Austrian residents of
Jewish origin as "refugeesn. Britain based its case on the ostensibly hiqh moral.principle that this was merely a backhanded attempt to clear Europe of its .Tews,in other words to accomp_lish Hit1er's goal of making the German-speaking parts
of Europe ",Judenrein".v The main Arab effort then shifted to prevent
resettlement of .Iews i.n Palestine by placing specific conditions on resettlement,
such as preventing resettlement where the Jews "will create politicaldifficulties in the countries of resettlement or in neighbourinq countries" or
where resettlement is undertaken "without the consent of the peoples of the
countries of reception and without fu11 consultation with the StateG members ofthe United Nationb most directly concerned".53 These efforts were also defeated
as were a number of other subseguent efforts.
Th9 Araps, backed by the British, were defeated in the attemptto make repatriation the exclusj-ve function of the IRO or to include .lews in
those slated for repatriation. Even when repatriation was argued on the highest
morals grounds of eguality, non-discrimination and the opposition to a Europefree of Jews, the Arabs and BriLish were unable to succeed in targeting the .Tewsfor what would have been forced repatriation. When the major efforts focused on
resettlement, the Arabs and British were unable to hedge the resettlement plans
with conditions which would exclude Palestine as a tarqet area for resettlbment
of the remnant of European 
'.fews. Instead a policy of resettlement which, in thecase of the .Tews, was forced upon the majority of the inhabitants of the area in
which they were to be resettl-ed. In the case of the Palestinian Arabs, a poJ.icy
of resettlernent bras adopted without the consent of the Palestinians -to be
resettled. The United Nations Relief and l{orks Agency for Palestine Refugees inthe Near East (UNRWA) was set up ostensibly to provide interim ai.d and
emplolment, but' in reality, to resettle the Palestinian refugees in the Arab
states under the guise of econonic integration.
If the first phase of the internaLional policy of dealing with
refugees had been characterized by open borders, the second phase hras
characterized by drawing new borders and dividing ethnic populations on different
sides of the border while guaranteeing the protection of minorities left on the
wrong side. The partition of Palestine was the last effort in that phase of
solvinq a refugee policy. As the last phase, a new state for the ,.Iews was
{9Records of the Teenty-First Ordlnary Session of the Leagnre of Natlons, p. 232.
uo21"t neettng of the Third Connittee of the United l{atlons General Asseurbly of the Unlted
Nations on Novenber t2, L946.
51of Annex 1, Part 1, sectlon H, para. 3.
52tlc.3/61-i A/c.3?68, p. 5, 9.
utEla6, p.6.
created, fsrael, and an almost fifty year legacy of Palestinian refugees without
a state to guarantee their protecti.on remained.
In contrast to the first phase of international refugee policy,the period was charact,erized by redrawn rather than open borders, by forced
repatriation and resettlement rather than the voi.untary free movement of people,
and by a system in which the international community accepted the respons-ibilityfor protecting minorities within the jurisdiction of a state and for provision
of their essential needs when they were outside the jurisdiction of a state in
which the refugees were members. It was a period characterized by a plethora ofinternational refugee organi.zations, each set up to deal with a specific refugeeproblem 
- much as ete now have a plethora of acronyms for peacekeeping operations
each set up to deal with a specific conflict area - rather than developing ageneric institutional approach to deal with all refugees. UNRWA was the last of
these institutional creations.
Thg Mandate of the UNHCR
The Convention of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
of 1951 moved away from regardi,ng refugees en nasse to focus on them aspersecuted individuals, moved away from assistance to legal protection, andfocused only upon those who were already outside the borders of their country of
origin in spite of the pleas by Greece, India and Pakistan that the mandateinclude those displaced by civil war, the latter arguing that those suffering
from disease and starvation were much worse off than those suffering persecution.
Eleanor Roosevelt led the debate and successful resolution that a gentine refugree
was one who was outside his/her country of origin and had fled beEause of a wetlfounded fear of persecution on a number of gtrounds. Such refugees would beguaranteed that (s)he would not be repatri.ated to the country where theindividual had been persecuted. To be a refugee wa3 a gruarantee that anindividual outside his or her own country and so labelled would not be returnedto that country. It was a refugee regime built on two principles - the human
rights of the individual and the sacrosanct character of the borders of thepolitical state. Because the original solution to the refugee problem focused on
resettlement, the other solution offered $ras voJuntaty repatriation; the
compulsory exchange of populations of the post l{!{I period had been rejected.
Instead of open or shifting borders, borders were reified. you
were only a refugee if you were outside the jurisdiction of the state that had
the historical responsibility of providing for an individual's protection. Forced
solutions were gj.ven up in favour of ostensible voluntarism. But it gras no longer
the voluntarism of the first part of the century r*ren there brere a large number
of states in which refugees could resettle. ft was d voluntarism which depended
on the willingness of states to also volunteer both to support the UNflCRfinancially and to provide opportunities for the persecuted individuals to
resettle. fnstead of a system of the individual seeking the protection of a state
or the international conununity ostensibly quaranteeing the protection of
minorities, the international -community ttrrougn the UllHCn glaranteed theprotection of individuals wtro had been persecuted and who had not yet been
accepted by a state which would assume responsibility for their protection.
Most refugees did not reguire that individual protection. They
were accepted en masse because they fled states regarded as enemy states with
antithetical values and norms. Those fleeing comnunism and the confines of the
Iron Curtain were resettled in the West. States, in particular the United States,
Australia and Canada, perceived refugees in ideological political terms. If youfled a communist regime, you were a refugee. In 1956 and 1968 refugees who hadfled from Hungary and Czechoslovakia were accepted en masse by these countries
of immigration and refugee resettlement. The refugees did not have to be
corcnunists. At the end of that period, Canada took in over i.00r000 American draft
dodgers and deserters from the Vietnam War because Canada wanted to differentiateitself from the behemoth to its south engaged j.n a war with which Canadians
largely disagreed, though Canada never had the courage to designate that intake
as a refugee flow.
The last ptr_ase of the development. of international refugee policy
a1{- eractice began in 1973. 
_Idi Aqin. began the practice of ethnic Cleansing.Chile began the practice of ideological cleansing. The Ugandan Asians weie
expellbd and Western states resettled its first group of refugees en masse who
were neither fleeing cotnmunism nor European. The socialists and communists who
opposed Pinochet were allowed to leave from thej.r sanctuaries in various
embassies and were also resettled. The beginning of a non-racist, non-ideological
refugee regime had begun. Of the 35,000 Ugandan Asians and 35,000 Chilean
refugees, Canada took in and resettled about 202 of each of those groups.
When the Communist government after its capture of the southbegan practices which led to a more subtle form of ethnic cleansing of theVietnamese Chinese and ideological cleansing of dissenters in the former SouthVietnam, a massive resettlement of what would number over a million refuqees was
lggun in the late seventies and early eighties. This was on top of the-massiveflows of refuqees into neighbouring states as refugees frorn eambodia, from aplethora of states in Afri.ca, from Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iran, frorn Cubainto Florida, settled temporarily or permanently in their first countries of
asylun.
During lhe eighties, the numbers seeking asylum grewexponentially. The developrnent of human rights laws wlthin Western stitesprovided increased protecbion that refugee claimants who arrived spontaneouslv
would be given the protection of due legal process under domestic legai
reguirements. By the late eighties, western states were inundated witn
spontaneous influxes of individual-s claiming refugee status in a system which was
only conceived and desigrned to handJe asylurn claimants in the hundreds. taws and
regulat.ions were passed throughout the western states who were signatories to theConvention to both provide legal processes for dealing with those-clairnants whilethe search began for means to stem the tide. States were both legally obligatedto_accept-these refugees if they satisfied the criteria. At Lhe-same tirne,
refuqee clainants wtro did not satisfy the reguirements were either lesallydeported or prevented by legal. neans (visas, fines on airlines, interdiation
outside the borders of one's state, etc.) from ariving in the first place.
For example, the OECD conference in March of 1993 in Madrid onMigration and Development attempted to examine whether development aid would
assist in steruning the tide of migrants - economic and po)-itical. Developnent
assistance as a nethod of steruning the flows of hordes of unwanted miglants
seemed to be put on the back burner once it hras recognized thaL in the shoit and
medium terms the flow of migrants would actually increase as a result of such
efforts.
The four phases of developnent of refugee policy witnessed a
shift from relatively open borders, to a policy of altering borders in the areas
of conflict, to a system of sacrosanct and fixed borders where those who crossedborders had either to await repatriation, integrate in the first country of
asylun or be resettled. When the latter demand seemed to overwhelm the supply of
spaces the 9[est seemed willing to provide, sacrosanct borders becarne increasingly
closed borders as the borders of other states were redrawn, de facto if not dejure. The four phases were characterized by: voluntary resettlementi forced
repatriation and resettlement; voluntary repatriation, settlement and
resettlement; and IegaIIy obligatory resettlement, repatriation and settlement
within the country of origin though perhaps in a different area than one's home.
The responsibility for protection shifted from the individual to an internationaltheoretical system for minority protection, an actual system for individual legalprotection, and protection of minority groups either through total resettlement
or repatriatj.on in a protected haven where they could act as a self-determining
and governing majority.
I now want to examine the contradictions of j-nternational- policy
wi.th respect to refugee flows in four distinct areas of internationaL
humanitarian military intervention - Iraq, Cambodia, Somal-ia and Yugoslavia.
Refugees and Peacekeepinq
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has
experi-mented with safe havens in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, and the delivery
of humanitarian aid protected by international troops inside countries of
conflict without the permission of any formaL state authority as in Somalia.International troops and observers are present in Cambodia to oversee the
reestablishment of both a civil society and a state regime to keep the peace.
Whi.Ie the international corununity dithers over Bosnia-Hercegovina, as we watch
day after day on our television screens the slaughter of helpless civilians andhear tales of their brutal treatment, particularly of women, the West debates
extending human.itarian military intervention to the killing grounds of Bosnia.In an effort at preventive peacekeeping, troops have been sent to the borders of
Macedonia to prevent the spread of the Yugoslav inbroglio and a consequent largerflow of refugees.
The link between peacekeeping and refugees begins after the end
of the Cold War in the latter part of the fourth phase of the above development
of the international refugee regime when peacekeeping moves out of its classical
phase of interposing blue helmets between two contending parties and peacekeepers
move into the interior of states without the consent of any or all parties to a
conflict and where there may have even been a total disintegration of a unified
state authority. To analyze this connection, the four cases of Iraq, Yugoslavia,
Somalia and Cambodia can be distinguished by two criteria - whether the states
are multi-national or predominately nation-states, and whether the states have
recognized governments in place which may bg in the process of being challengedby a nilitant opposition, or whether there is an absence of a single recogniied
authority over the whole state or area and there is a presence of competinggroups seeking authority through the barrel of a gun.
Iraq and the Kurds
Prior to the termination of the Cold War and the effort to
establish a new international world order following the invasion by and defeat
of Iraq in Kuwait, there was an uprising by the Kurds against the rule of Saddam
Hussein. The intact Iraqi army began to guell the rebellion and the Kurds were
forced into the hills as they were turned back from the borders of Turkey but not
the borders of Iran. Prior to the Gulf lfar, the Turks might have been accused bythe international comrnunity for closing its borders to the persecuted Kurds.Instead, the United States obtained international sanction to create safe havensfor the Kurds in northern Iraq, thereby creating the conditions for the
development of an autonomous de facto state of Kurdistan under internationalprotection but without international recognition. The old consul-tative assemblybuilding j-n lrbil for the powerless Kurd assenbly has been renovated to house the
Kurdish parliarnent. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership
of Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) under Maoud Barzani's
Ieadership have done the unthinkable, merged their peshmerga forces i.nto a single
national army. The Kurds have created a legislative arm and the political
authorities of the nascent state has been given the monopoly over the use of
coercive force. They even have a foreign policy. In return for cooperating with
the Turks in the crushing of the Kurdish rebels within Turkey, the Turkish armedforces provide logistic support to the nascent Kurdish state all under the
auspices of a humanitarian relief effort to provide a safe haven for the Kurds.
The international community says that no state should refoul,e a
refugee fleeing persecution. $lhen they are forcefully prevented from seeking
asylum, the international comnunity did not condernn those guilty of refoulement,
buL intervened to provide protection for the Turkish border and for the Kurdish
rninority within the supposedly sacrosanct borders of the nation-state of Iraq,
reinforcing thereby a quasi separatist state.54 The international communitv 1irthe name of sacrosanct borders and the int.egrity of the state of Kuwait ord6redfraq to be attacked. In the aftermath of that victory, the international
community still upheld the sacrosanct, character of state borders but has been the
major instrument for the de facto division of lraq.
cam9edig,
Canbodi-a is renowned the world over for its infamous killinqfields and the estimated one and one half million Cambodians killed when Lh6Khners Rouge.s occupied the seat of government in Phnom Penh. When they weredriven out by the Viebnamese, they retained some control in north-wbstern
Canbodia and took control of the large camps within Thailand which housed
"refugees" 
.ryltom the Thais had refused to allow to be desigrnated formally asrefugees. With the agtreement among the four contending parties- in Cambodia af the
end of 1991 to end hostilities and attenpt to create-a government, The UnitedNations committed three billion dollars and over 20,000 peacekeepers to overseethe successful return of almost 4001000 refugees and the recreation of a civil
and political order in Canbodia.
For the first time, even the ltapanese agreed to contributepeacekeeping forces. With great difficulty, the Japanese reversed their postwar
ban against sending J_apaqege troops onto foreign territory Peacekeepers were sent
under the auspices of UNTAC, the tlN TransitionaL Authority in Carnboilia, to ensure
a peaceful election of a constitut,ional assembly on May 23-25, 1993. But thedecision was dependent on both sides agreeing to the .Iapanese role.
The Khmers Rouges abrogated the agreernent. They refused to disarm
or take part in the election. At the end of ,.January of this year, the phnom penhgovernmen! in.a militarY PSgyenlive action to stop an alleged Khmers Rouges dry
season offensive' attacke{ t\e Khmers Rouges at Siem Reap in the north-west, at
Kompong Thom 1n central Cambodia, at Kratie in the cintral eastern area of
Cambodia and in a najor thrust agai.nst the Khrners Rouges headguarters at Pailin
along the_Thai border. The Khmers Rouges struck back. They began their ownprocess of 
.ethnic cleansing py attacking Vietnamese settlements- in Cambodia,beginning with the murder of 34 Vietnamese on March 9th in the floating villagb
on the Tonle Sap river in the area ostensibly controlled by the undisciplinedBulgarian peacekeepers who h?ve_ been accused of sexually h-rassing and iaping
Canbodian women and ignoring Cambodian traffic laws. Subseguent attacks follbwed
and a number of the 400'000 Vietnanese in Carnbodia have fled as even thegovernment party fails to even speak up for their protection. 4001000 Cambodian
refugees have been returned under UN auspices. Are we witnessing the creation of
400,000 Vietnamese refugees under UN auspices in exchange? The Khrners Rouges have
attacked and kil.led BuJ.garian peacekeepers and even killed one Japanesepolicenan, in the process and raising another hue and cry in Japan about the
Japanese presence in Cambodia. Even Phnom Penh is not inunune from attack asgrenade attacks and firebombs are thrown at cafes in the capital.
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prosecutor to try two alleged killers, a Phnom Penh policeman and a Khmers Rouges
soldier, but no actual trial seems to be in the offing. The UN has sent, -in
peacekeepers in a land where one of the parties openly disavows electoral
5{ cf. Adelman, iHumanitarian lDterventlon: The Case of the Kurds, i fpt.ernatlon?I. ,tournal
9f_89$Se9_-!_ag, volu[re 4, No. 1, April 1992 and iThe Ethics of Huuranj.tarian Interventlon: The Case;ffiE-f;ilAffi"Refugees," Public Aifalls Oualterly, nSpecial Issue on Refugeesrn volume 6, Issue 1,
January 1992,
pol-itics, has refused to surrender i-ts arms and bl-atantly attacks Vietnamese
civilians, UN election and humanitarian officials and the UN peacekeepers
themselves. No monopoly on the control and use of coercive force has been
established in Camboclia, the prereguisite to developing a civil society and a
government selected by and responslble to the people.
What can the UN forces do after the electi-on - withdraw and watch
a civil war break out or increase their numbers to give the newly elected
government a chance, assuming, of course, that the electoral process works
adequately enough for a government to be considered as the legitimate
representative of the people.
The contradiction is the following. The UN claims to be impartial
and neutral between and among conpeLing factj.ons. In facL, it is not partia.I at
all. It is committed to a liberal theory of responsible goverrunent and ofindividual human rights. At the sane tirner it is corunitted to a stable order
based on the sovereignty of states with the state holding a monopoly on the use
of coercive power. But while the UN may insist that a state have an elected form
of government responsible to and chosen by the people, the UN does Iittle to
uphold the fact and the principle that any responsible government must have a
monopoly on the use of force. In the hands of an irresponsible government, that.
monopoly can be turned against the people themselves.
UN AuthoritJ and Somalia
The UN sent troops to police Somalia but they were useless and
had to stay in their barracks until they were rescued by a much largier, better
eguipped US force sent not so much to rescue Somalia from anarchy as to rescue
the iJN from an impotent effort at peacekeeping. Since the American forces have
departed, reports emerge that the nilitant anarchy is also returning. Given the
stigma attached to the presence of Arnerican forces, there is a reluctance on thepart of the Americans as well as the international community to rely on the
overwhelming power of the US, but without the presence of that overwhelmingpower, the ability to repress those who wouJd resort to arms to resolve theirdifferences seems to diminish over time.
Further, in the anarchy of Somalia, a central authority is neededto run the economy and institute a working judicial system. Tbe Econonist has
called for the UN to set itself up as "king of the Somali castle." (l4arch 6-12,p. 18) But this is precisely wfiat the people themselves must do. The UN must not
establish itself as king of the castle but as a praetorian guard until theinstitutions of the civil society and the political state are reestablished and
strengthened.
Ethnic Cleansinq in Bosnia-HPrceqovina
How is the international conmunity to navigate between the Scylla
of ethnic nationalism and the Charybdes of sacrosanct sovereign states? How, asPatrick Moynihan recently phrased the guestion lPandenoniun: Ethnicity infnternatioial Politics, Oxford: OUP) can the world be made safe both for ethnic
groups and from ethnic fanaticism? (Cf. also Adelman, nEthnicity and Refugees, "in Wor1d Refuqes Sulvev, 1992, pp. 6-L1.)
Can one really take seriously that the Croats, Serbs and Muslim
Bosnians could live in peace together successfully in a reorganized federal statein line with the Vance-Owen peace plan? Can the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina
real.ly be expected to surrender lhe contiguity and enlargement of theirt,errilorial base in Bosnia-Hercegovina? How can those territories be recreated
as dominantly Muslim cantons when they have already_begn ethnically cleansed ?ldpopulated bv-Serbs since under the LatesL version of the Vance-Olen p1an, Muslim
'foices wili not be allowed to return? Though the Security Council voted on
February 22nd to set up a 
_the first special war crimes tribunal since Neurenbergdoes anyone expect any of the war criminals to be tried?
In other words, the peace plan says it provides for a return trthe'statug qug anter,but in the form of a federated state, while everyone seemsto recoqr.tlze it really means the international recognition of the separation ofthe ethnic.gropps in._a-ccordance with the facts on 
€he ground. Ethnii cleansingat this late date will have been rewarded in the guise of an internationally
imposed peace. Even the earlier efforts of the United States to airdrop reliei
supplies in the beginning of March was debated as a controversial move wtrich
might arouse Serb aggression and stimulate attacks against the lightly arrned gNpeacekeeping forces.
So 75,000 peacekeepers night be reguired to ostensibly to keeppeace between ethnic aroups but, in reality, to recognize the order of victory -the victory of Serbs over both Croats and Muslims and the victory of the Croits
over the Muslims. The alternative-to such a hlpocritical peace plan is bombing
of Serb artilleryr-supply.Iities qld supplies and perhrpg lifting the arms embargo
on the Muslims. Alternatively, UN peacekeepers could be senb-into an unstabie
area to secure safe havens for Lhe- refugees when it is difficult enough for the
UN troops to provide safe havens for themseLves. The obligations are-difficult
enough to sort out without raising guestions about the contradictory goals andthe questionable means of achieving a moral obligation of protecting civiliansfrom slaughter and rape.
Conclusion
There are numerous other areas where the UN could be sent to keepthe peace between and among waring ethnic factions, warlords and tribes - thbconflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Myanmar, in South Africa, etc. In
most of those places, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Somalia, Kurdistan and Canbodia,there is no real peace to keep, But at least the UN troops may have inhibitei
morg qxpansionist all-out wars. In none of these areas is there a clearly definedpolitical objective within reach or honestly articulated. Each situation is fuIIof contradictions and controversy. The chances of success is slim as BoutrosBoutros Ghali promotes his new Agenda for Peace.
The UN in the guise of creating safe havens for refuqeesparticipates in the de facto partition of a country, the very presence instigatedin defence of the sacrosanct character of state borders. The UN, in the atiemptto create a neutral ground for the creation of a democratic regime in Cambodii,
becomes a target for militants with both real and moral bullets. The UN wtrich
began its history as the instrument for decolonization, is urged on to become theinstrument of neo-colonial authority in Somalia. And in Bosnia-Hercegovina the
UN, through delay and procrasti.nation, is destined to become the authority wtrich
sanctions ethnic cleansing and guards the reality on the ground as it deplores
these same results rhetorically.
The league of peace is not and cannot be in the business of
stopping each and every war. It must, as Kant said, be in the business of naking
an end of all wars forever. Two criteria were proffered. The leagiue (or the UN)
cannot operate as king of the castle, assura:ing dominion over the power of the
state even if only on an interim basis but must restrict its efforts to the
maintenance of freedom and security. The inhabitants of the state itself have to
renain responsible for reconstructing their civil society and reestablishing thegoverrunent. Further, each peacekeeping operation should be assessed in terms of
whether or not it contributes or detracts from the long term goal of terminating
war altoget.her. The UN can only do this if it sorts out whether it wants to be
a league of nations protecting ethnic groups and ensuring they have a role intheir own self-determination (there are over 5000 nations on this earth) or a
league of states with sacrosanct borders, Otherwise the UN will meander from oneinsoluble quagmire to another.
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The real question is whether the international community is willing to risk thelives of its citizens serving under UN auspices for a cause in which there is no
irmnediate or apparent security threat to thenselves, no vital economic lnterests,
no military aggression across a recognized international border of a member of
the UN.
It will only do so if there are clear moral guidelines and goalsfor doing so. The UNHCR has moved fro protecting refugees who have fled across
a border to attempting to protect displaced persons within a border, but it is
not clear about its mandate or the measures it must use to protect minorities
within such states. Until a clear guideline has been established for both self-
determination and for the protection of mi.norities' and until the UN is willingto assert its fuIl powers to monopoLize the use of coercive power until statesin conflict put their house in order, the UN will continue to be hampered by
contradictory normative conceptions and ineffectual tools on the ground.
